UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/92
27 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 January 1994, 1/ and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 13 January 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 2/

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1994;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, 3/ approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

1/ S/1994/62.

2/ S/1994/30.

3/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978, document S/12611.

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/93
27 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We regret having to express our deepest concern about reports over the past several days by our Government as well as international media, informing us of a renewed and intensive deployment of Yugoslav Army troops and armoured vehicles coming mainly from three directions: from Serbia through Bjeljina, Zvornik and Visegrad. This is only the latest evidence of blatant Serbian and Montenegrin aggression against the internationally recognized, sovereign and independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a full Member of the United Nations.

With the renewed shelling of Tuzla, where only yesterday five civilians were killed, plus other reported attacks in other areas of the region, as well as the regrouping of Serb forces throughout the region, we have firm grounds to believe that the above-mentioned reports indicate a new Serb offensive against the United Nations-protected safe areas and the civilian population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These military activities not only represent a new threat to the peace process, but are an arrogant demonstration by the Serbian regime of its contempt for, and wish to erase, the existence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This further unmasks its total disrespect for relevant United Nations resolutions and international peace and order.

We firmly protest the involvement of Serbian and Montenegrin troops and request the urgent action of the Security Council in accordance with its resolutions 819 (1993), 824 (1993), 836 (1993) and 838 (1993).

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Chargé d'affaires, a. i.
Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/94
28 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 18 January 1994 (S/1994/50) regarding the safe areas Srebrenica and Tuzla. In that letter, I indicated that I would revert to the Security Council as soon as I had received the detailed plans which I had asked Mr. Yasushi Akashi, my Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, to prepare. Mr. Akashi has now submitted to me the plans which, following consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have been prepared under his direction by the Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

I should like to recall that since early December UNPROFOR has faced Bosnian Serb opposition to the replacement of Canadian troops in Srebrenica and of Ukrainian troops in Zepa by elements of the incoming Netherlands battalion. As regards Tuzla, at the request of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNPROFOR has been making efforts to open the main airfield for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Tuzla safe area and the nearby areas of Central Bosnia. It was in this context that the recent summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 11 January reaffirmed NATO's readiness to support UNPROFOR's efforts.

Both plans submitted by Mr. Akashi, i.e. the one for the rotation of the troops in Srebrenica and Zepa and the one for the opening of Tuzla airport, envisage three scenarios:

1. the objective is achieved through negotiations and with the consent of the parties;

2. the consent of the parties is not obtained but UNPROFOR judges that they are unlikely to use military force to prevent the achievement of the objective. Existing UNPROFOR military assets already available throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina are used, supported, if necessary, by air power provided by NATO;

3. the consent of the parties is not obtained and scenario 2 has failed because they have used military force to prevent the achievement of the objective. Existing UNPROFOR military assets already available in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reinforced with additional troops and

equipment contributed by Member States, are used, supported, if necessary, by air power provided by NATO.

The first two scenarios represent a measured step-by-step approach geared to the attitude of the parties, which would have to be carefully ascertained through constant contact. The third scenario would imply a different level of military action and could not be implemented until the Security Council had authorized the additional troops and equipment that would be necessary and these had been deployed in theatre.

According to these plans, air power would be used, if necessary, in self-defence against a deliberate attack upon UNPROFOR by any party. Should UNPROFOR be attacked in the implementation of the plans, I would not hesitate to initiate the use of close air support without delay. To this end arrangements have been made with NATO, which has already authorized its forces to provide close air support to UNPROFOR in cases of self-defence. It is important in this context to make clear that a distinction exists between close air support, which involves the use of air power for purposes of self-defence, and air strikes, which involve the use of air power for pre-emptive or punitive purposes. Whereas the North Atlantic Council has already authorized close air support, I have been informed by the Secretary-General of NATO that NATO forces are not authorized to launch air strikes, which would require a further decision of the North Atlantic Council.

It is obviously desirable that the plans should, if possible, be implemented in accordance with the first scenario, i.e. by mutual agreement. The parties should, however, be aware that UNPROFOR's mandate for the safe areas has been adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, UNPROFOR is not obliged to seek the consent of the parties for operations which fall within the mandate conferred upon it under Security Council resolutions 836 (1983) and 844 (1993).

In regard to the present situation in Srebrenica and Zepa, I should like to inform the Council that on 10 and 13 January, respectively, my Special Representative met with the Serbian President, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, and the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, both of whom assured him that they had no political objections to the planned rotation. In a meeting at Sarajevo airport on 19 January, the Bosnian Serb military leader assured the Force Commander of UNPROFOR that there would be no further obstacles to the rotation of UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica and Zepa. On 25 January, a reconnaissance party of the Netherlands battalion went into Srebrenica and Zepa without any impediment. It is planned that the entire rotation should be completed by the end of February. I hope that there will be no need to proceed to the second scenario. Nevertheless, the plans presented to me by Mr. Akashi also include that scenario for Srebrenica and Zepa, should any new obstacles be placed in UNPROFOR's way.

The plan for Tuzla is based on the concept that UNPROFOR takes control of the airport from the forces of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to ensure that its facilities will not be used for purposes other than the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is intended that an agreement will be concluded similar to the one which has, since June 1992, governed the use of

Sarajevo airport. The Bosnian Serb leadership has repeatedly raised the concern that Tuzla airport may be used for military objectives, such as arms supplies. An airport agreement, including the stationing of Bosnian Serb monitors at the airport, will remove this concern.

As a first step, the plan for Tuzla airport envisages the withdrawal of the Government forces now deployed at the airport and in its immediate environs. I have instructed my Special Representative to pursue this matter urgently with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which already has indicated to him its general willingness to consider the Sarajevo airport type of arrangement.

Once such an agreement has been reached, UNPROFOR will take over control of the airport and operate it, initially with its own aircraft only. When the security of the airport has been established, the countries contributing to the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo will be invited to extend their services to Tuzla. As already indicated, arrangements will be made for on-site monitoring of the airport by representatives of both the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs.

I believe that the above arrangement will meet the concerns of the parties and that it will be possible to obtain agreement from both sides. Should such agreement not be reached, UNPROFOR will be obliged to resort to the second scenario, asking the Government's forces to withdraw and unilaterally declaring the airport open for humanitarian purposes. In order to achieve this, UNPROFOR will need to draw on military assets available not only in the Tuzla area of deployment but also from elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Given the limited military assets available to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Force Commander has recommended that the two operations, if conducted under the second scenario, be undertaken sequentially. I have therefore accepted his proposal that UNPROFOR should first achieve the rotation in Srebrenica and Zepa before proceeding to the opening of Tuzla airport, unless the latter is possible through negotiations. The Force Commander has also pointed to the desirability of each of these operations, if conducted under the second scenario, being carried out by forces drawn from as many different national contingents of UNPROFOR as possible. This will demonstrate the united commitment of the international community to fulfilling these objectives.

It would be irresponsible of me not to point out that, in the judgement of my Special Representative, which I share, any resort to the second scenario, and a fortiori to the third scenario, entails considerable risk for UNPROFOR's operations and for the troops involved in its implementation, as well as for the humanitarian assistance operation. Despite these risks, I am instructing my Special Representative to pursue actively the implementation of the two plans, in direct contact with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. I shall keep the Security Council regularly informed of the progress made. The Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations will also brief the countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this connection, I should like to inform the Council that, in the specific circumstances of these operations relating to Srebrenica and Tuzla, I

have delegated to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the authority to approve a request for close air support from the Force Commander.

The difficulties UNPROFOR has encountered in regard to both issues are in part due to the fact that all the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are in one way or another trying to take tactical advantage of the Force's presence. Each action of UNPROFOR is perceived as being to the advantage of one or the other of the warring parties. As a result, the respective sides are increasingly questioning the Force's impartiality, which is the key to its effectiveness in implementing the mandates entrusted to it by the Council. I believe the time has come to reflect on the role of UNPROFOR in order to chart the course to be taken in the future, and I will be undertaking a comprehensive review of the functions and responsibilities of UNPROFOR prior to the Security Council's consideration of the renewal of its mandate in March 1994.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/95
28 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached letter, dated today, from my Prime Minister to Your Excellency.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 28 January 1994 from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to an open military intervention of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia against the sovereign and independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a member of the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests an emergency meeting of the Security Council.

It has been reported that the following military formations of the regular armed forces of the Republic of Croatia are presently involved in military actions on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- 113th Brigade of Split - active in the Vrdi sector, carrying out offensive military actions in the area;
- 1st Guard Brigade - composed of mercenaries, active in the Prozor sector;
- 5th Guard Brigade from Zagreb, in the wider region of Mostar;
- Specialized military groups "PANTHERS", "TIGERS", and "MATIJA VLACIC" from Zagreb, active in the sector of Mostar.

In the sector of Prozor and Gornji Vakuf, the following formations are reported active:

- 114th Brigade of Sibenik;
- 3rd Brigade of the Council of National Guard from Osijek;
- 109th Brigade of the Croatian Army from Vukovar;
- Brigades of the Croatian Army from Vinkovci and Varazdin;
- Brigades of the Croatian Army estimated at 1,100 soldiers;
- 2,000 Croatian Army soldiers from Zagreb;
- "BLACK LEGIONS" performing special reconnaissance activities.

Presently, it is reported that five additional brigades of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Council of Defense are moving towards Prozor.

At the Posavina front, in the sector of Orasje, four brigades of the Croatian army, a tank echelon (20 tanks) and two artillery divisions are militarily engaged.

It has also been noted that since 24 January 1994, a renewed mobilization of Bosnian Croat and Muslim refugees in Dalmatia has taken place, with the purpose of their military engagement in an offensive that resumed only recently in the sector of Prozor-Gornji Vakuf. An additional 20,000 soldiers are sought for recruitment.

Along with these activities, the Center for Special Police training in Zagreb is currently engaged in training and forming terrorist task forces named "JOKERS", "KNIGHTS", "LIGHTNING".

In recent days, the use of air support (UTVA planes) of military operations and helicopters of the Croatian Army in the Herzegovina region and in Central Bosnia has been evident.

Thus, we conclude that in the sector of Mostar, Prozor and Gornji Vakuf, 12 brigades of the regular Croatian army with manpower estimated at 15,000 to 18,000 soldiers is directly involved in military operations. In the Posavina sector, the estimate goes as far as 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers of the Croatian army. Accordingly, the estimate ranges from 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers of the Croatian army actively participating in military operations against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This high number of Croatian regular army troops are supplemented by heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and numerous other war materials.

Due to these military activities, the plight of civilians has increased, destruction of material assets are enormous, humanitarian convoys are hindered or denied passage, and all the efforts of the legitimate governmental bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina aiming at the cessation of hostilities and the continuation of the peace process have been endangered.

Excellency:

We express our deepest concern about such an extent of military intervention of the Republic of Croatia in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and request the Security Council to firmly condemn such activities and to take all the necessary measures in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and all of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

(Signed) Dr. Haris SILAJDZIC
Prime Minister

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/96
31 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 849 (1993) of 9 July 1993, 854 (1993) of 6 August 1993, 858 (1993) of 24 August 1993, 876 (1993) of 19 October 1993, 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993 and 892 (1993) of 22 December 1993,

Also reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 concerning the security of United Nations operations,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 25 January 1994 concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia (S/1994/80 and Add.1),

Welcoming the Communiqué on the second round of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed in Geneva on 13 January 1994 (S/1994/32), recalling the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Geneva on 1 December 1993 (S/26875), and emphasizing the importance of implementation by the parties of the obligations to which they have committed themselves,

Taking note that the parties, in the Communiqué, state that they continue to favour the deployment in the zone of conflict of United Nations peace-keeping forces or other forces, subject to authorization by the United Nations,

Taking note also of the next expert level talks to be held between the parties in Moscow on 8 February 1994 and of the intention of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to convene a new round of negotiations in Geneva on 22 February 1994,

Recognizing the grave situation in the Republic of Georgia created by the presence of almost 300,000 persons displaced from Abkhazia,

Noting again the conclusions of the ministerial meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Rome on 30 November and 1 December 1993 (S/26843), and welcoming the continuing cooperation between the United Nations and the CSCE in this matter,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General of 25 January 1994;

2. Welcomes the continued efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, in cooperation with the Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation as facilitator, to carry forward the peace process with the aim of achieving an overall political settlement, and welcomes in particular the progress achieved so far;

3. Urges the parties to resume the negotiations as soon as possible and to demonstrate stronger willingness to achieve progress towards a comprehensive political settlement;

4. Calls upon all concerned to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, and stresses the importance it attaches to such respect;

5. Stresses that substantive progress must be made immediately on the political status of Abkhazia, respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, if the negotiations are to succeed and further conflict is to be avoided;

6. Approves the continuation of UNOMIG's mandate until 7 March 1994 within the numbers authorized in resolution 892 (1993);

7. Declares its readiness, within this period, to consider promptly any recommendation from the Secretary-General to further increase the strength of UNOMIG up to the limit specified in resolution 858 (1993) should the Secretary-General so recommend;

8. Takes note of the options described by the Secretary-General in his report (S/1994/80) for possible establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately following the third round of negotiations between the parties on progress, if any, made in the negotiations and on the situation on the ground, with special attention to circumstances which might warrant a peace-keeping force and on the modalities for such a force;

10. Underlines the importance of substantive progress towards a political settlement at the next round of negotiations for further consideration by the Council of possible establishment of a peace-keeping force in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia;

11. Recognizes the right of all refugees and displaced persons affected by the conflict to return, without preconditions, to their homes in secure conditions, calls upon the parties to honour the commitments they have already made in this regard, and urges the parties to come to an expeditious agreement, including a binding timetable, that would assure the rapid return of these refugees and displaced persons in secure conditions;

12. Condemns any attempts to change the demographic composition of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, including by repopulating it with persons not previously resident there;

13. Calls upon the parties to comply fully with the cease-fire to which they have committed themselves;

14. Urges the parties to take all steps necessary to ensure the security of UNOMIG personnel and welcomes the readiness of the Russian Federation to assist them in this regard;

15. Encourages donor States to assist the Republic of Georgia to enable it to overcome the consequences of the conflict and to make contributions in response to the United Nations humanitarian appeal;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/97
31 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note verbale with attachments dated 23 December 1993, from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington to the Embassy of Pakistan to be forwarded to the United States Department of State on the violation of territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran by the forces of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 23 December 1993 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington addressed to the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington presents its compliments to the Embassy of Pakistan, and has the honour to quote the attached message, in two copies - the original text and an unofficial translation - received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text of the messages be transmitted to the United States Department of State and that our office be informed of its response.

Enclosure

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, United States warships positioned in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf have created a nuisance for Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft and helicopters on the following dates and at the following times:

1. On 25 June 1993 at 1428 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2820 and E5020 warned an Iranian fighter plane, whose position was N2830 and E5040.

2. On 25 July 1993 at 1630 hours, a United States warship warned an Iranian sea-patrolling helicopter, whose position was N2825 and E5030.

3. On 28 July 1993 at 1107 hours, a United States warship warned an Iranian sea-patrolling helicopter, whose position was N2830 and E5035.

4. On 31 July 1993 at 0957 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2830 and E5015 warned an Iranian sea-patrolling helicopter, whose position was N2830 and E5020.

5. On 7 September 1993 at 0955 hours, a United States warship warned an Iranian sea-patrolling helicopter, whose position was N2910 and E4950.

6. On 8 September 1993 at 1020 hours, a United States warship warned an Iranian sea-patrolling helicopter, whose position was N2920 and E4950.

7. On 16 September 1993 at 1015 and 1058 hours, a United States warship warned an Iranian sea-patrolling helicopter, at the position of N2910 and E4950 and also at the position of N2855 and E4930.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests such illegal actions by the Government of the United States.

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GENERAL

S/1994/98
31 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of Col. Lj. Stojadinovic, Head of the Information Service of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, concerning the reports in certain media on the alleged involvement of the Army of Yugoslavia in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

There are no units of the Army of Yugoslavia in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We do not exclude the possibility that citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are fighting in the units of the Army of the Republic of Srpska as volunteers, including some former members of the Army of Yugoslavia.

We are convinced that the Yugoslav and world public knows that a great number of mercenaries, fanatics, adventurists or volunteers from Islamic countries are fighting in the Muslim army against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Volunteers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as free people, cannot be denied the right to decide on their own destiny and fight for the survival of their people, all the more so since, in its struggle against Serbs, Islamic fundamentalism has already assumed planetary proportions.

The troops and heavy weapons of the Army of Yugoslavia have not been moved towards Bosnia or any other State. They are moving exclusively on the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia according to assessments which imply the right to create the most favourable conditions for the defence of the sovereignty and safeguarding of peace of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its citizens. The most recent allegations against the Army of Yugoslavia justify this caution in the most direct way.

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GENERAL

S/1994/99
28 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 13 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 883 (1993)

1. On 11 November 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted resolution 883 (1993), following its consideration of the item entitled "Letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991 from France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (S/23306, S/23307, S/23308, S/23309 and S/23317)", relating to the question of compliance by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with its obligations under Council resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992).

2. In paragraph 12 of resolution 883 (1993) the Security Council called upon all States, including States not Members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of that resolution.

3. Under paragraph 13 of the same resolution, the Council requested all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15 January 1994 on the measures they had instituted for meeting their obligations under resolution 883 (1993).

4. Immediately following the adoption of resolution 883 (1993), the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution by telegram to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all States.

5. As of 24 January 1994, 24 replies had been received pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 883 (1993). Each of the replies has been issued as a document of the Security Council in the chronological order of the communications, as indicated below:

1.	Norway	22 December 1993	S/1994/35
2.	Italy	23 December 1993	S/26925
3.	Finland	3 January 1994	S/1994/36
4.	Cuba	6 January 1994	S/1994/37
5.	Madagascar	12 January 1994	S/1994/38
6.	Cyprus	12 January 1994	S/1994/39
7.	Brazil	12 January 1994	S/1994/40
8.	Nicaragua	13 January 1994	S/1994/41
9.	Hungary	13 January 1994	S/1994/76

10.	Poland	14 January 1994	S/1994/42
11.	Switzerland	14 January 1994	S/1994/77
12.	Denmark	14 January 1994	S/1994/75
13.	Australia	14 January 1994	S/1994/73
14.	Japan	14 January 1994	S/1994/49
15.	India	14 January 1994	S/1994/48
16.	Greece	14 January 1994	S/1994/58
17.	Malta	14 January 1994	S/1994/74
18.	United States of America	15 January 1994	S/1994/84
19.	Czech Republic	15 January 1994	S/1994/66
20.	Singapore	18 January 1994	S/1994/67
21.	Turkey	19 January 1994	S/1994/68
22.	Bulgaria	20 January 1994	S/1994/82
23.	Sweden	20 January 1994	S/1994/85
24.	France	21 January 1994	S/1994/72

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/100
29 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to inform the Council as soon as an effective cease-fire was established, and in any case by 1 February 1994, on progress made by the parties in the Lusaka talks, including a report on progress achieved in furthering the peace process, establishing an effective cease-fire and implementing relevant Security Council resolutions and the "Acordos de Paz" (see S/22609, annex). The Security Council further requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed of developments relating to the possible augmentation of the existing components of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. Since my last report to the Security Council dated 14 December 1993 (S/26872), my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, with the support of the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America), has pursued his efforts to bring the Lusaka talks between the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to a successful completion and to have the parties reach an agreement on a comprehensive peace settlement aimed at establishing an effective and sustainable settlement of the Angolan conflict within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

3. On 11 December 1993, the parties adopted the general and specific principles, as well as the modalities, including a timetable, relating to all military issues on the agenda: the re-establishment of the cease-fire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; the demobilization as well as the disarming of all civilians; and the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, including demobilization. At that

time, it was also agreed to take up immediately thereafter the other political issues on the agenda of the Lusaka talks, i.e., the police; the new mandate of the United Nations and the role of the three observer States of the "Acordos de Paz"; national reconciliation; and the completion of the electoral process; and, under the heading of "other pending issues", the re-establishment of State administration throughout the country.

4. However, on 13 December 1993, the head of the UNITA delegation informed my Special Representative that an area located near the city of Kuito/Bié had been bombarded. According to UNITA, "Dr. Savimbi had been in that area since 9 December 1993 to persuade the local UNITA military commanders to accept the terms of the agreements reached on the military issues during the Lusaka talks". The UNITA delegation felt that these air bombardments were a "clear attempt on the life of the UNITA leader and had been premeditated by the Government of Angola" and that their trust in the Government's good faith had therefore been shaken; hence they insisted that the Government provide explanations on the incident before they would continue participating in the peace talks. The government delegation strongly denied the allegations and asserted that the bombardments were "in reaction to" a UNITA military column that was moving towards Kuito/Bié.

5. In view of the seriousness of the situation, Mr. Beye travelled to Luanda on 13 December 1993 to consult with the competent Angolan authorities on this incident. The Government, and President José Eduardo dos Santos, considered that "the allegations made by UNITA were nothing but diversionary tactics on the eve of the meeting of the Security Council on Angola" and cited several other political, diplomatic and military reasons in rejecting the allegations.

6. In view of the conflicting claims presented by the Government and UNITA, my Special Representative decided to send to the area a fact-finding mission, chaired by the UNAVEM II Chief Operations Officer and composed of the UNAVEM II Senior Police Observer and of one military representative of each of the three observer States. My Special Representative proposed that, while the fact-finding mission carried out its tasks, the peace talks should continue. The government delegation accepted this proposal; the UNITA delegation, while accepting the fact-finding mission, insisted that it would resume participation in the talks only after the mission had reported its conclusions.

7. The fact-finding mission met on 16 and 17 December 1993 in Luanda with representatives of the Government, including the Angolan Armed Forces, with staff of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit of UNAVEM II, and with representatives of the World Food Programme (WFP), which has been carrying out humanitarian operations in Kuito/Bié. On 18 December 1993, the mission members visited the city where they met with local representatives of the Government and UNITA, as well as with representatives of the local population. Based on the information obtained during this visit, the mission determined that:

(a) On 11 December 1993, an unspecified number of government air force planes had bombed UNITA military and logistic positions located in an area some 5 to 12 kilometres west of Kuito/Bié;

(b) There was no evidence that Mr. Jonas Savimbi was in the vicinity of the above-mentioned location at the time of the bombing raid.

From the foregoing, the mission concluded that, while the government air force did carry out a bombing raid against UNITA, there was no credible and conclusive evidence that the Government had intended to kill Mr. Savimbi.

8. While the fact-finding mission was in Kuito/Bié, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, in his capacity as Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa and Chairman of the front-line States, invited Mr. Beye to visit Harare, where the latter attended the front-line heads of State summit and also held consultations with President Mugabe. At the summit, Mr. Beye appealed to the front-line States to support the efforts of the United Nations aimed at continuing the peace negotiations in Lusaka until a comprehensive peace agreement had been reached.

9. After its return to Lusaka, the fact-finding mission submitted its report on 20 December 1993 to my Special Representative, who transmitted copies of the report to the delegations of the Government and UNITA, requesting their written reaction by the morning of the following day. The government delegation replied the same day that it had noted the contents of the report, and reaffirmed its readiness to continue the peace talks. The UNITA delegation, in a letter in the name of Mr. Savimbi dated 21 December 1993, "acknowledged receipt of the report and accepted to resume the participation of its delegation in the negotiations", while also indicating that "a break should be observed and talks could be resumed on 5 January 1994". The UNITA leader later addressed a similar request to me.

10. The negotiations resumed on 21 December 1993 and continued until 23 December in the form of proximity talks on a document relating to the agenda item on the police, which was prepared by the Special Representative and the three observer States. It was then agreed by all concerned to suspend the negotiations until 5 January 1994. Prior to the departure of the government and UNITA delegations, Mr. Beye and the representatives of the observer States decided to transmit a note verbale addressed to the Minister of External Relations of the Government of Angola and a letter addressed to Mr. Savimbi in which they, inter alia:

(a) Expressed their deep concern over the recent intensification of offensive military actions;

(b) Reminded the Government of Angola and UNITA of the appeal made by the Security Council that they "honour the commitments already made by them at the Lusaka talks by exercising maximum restraint", in compliance with resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993;

(c) Reminded the parties of the Security Council's appeal to the Government and UNITA "to cease all military operations";

(d) Requested the Government and UNITA to send to the Special Representative a written commitment to respect the relevant provisions of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993.

11. In order to obtain maximum support for these démarches, my Special Representative resumed his intensive consultations with the heads of State of the subregion. On 24 December 1993, he met with President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, who expressed his continuing support for the United Nations efforts. Subsequently, Mr. Beye held useful consultations in Namibia with President Sam Nujoma on 27 December 1993. Upon his return to Luanda, my Special Representative met with President dos Santos, the Minister of External Relations of Angola, the President of the National Assembly and the Archbishop of Luanda. He then paid visits to President Miguel Trovoada of São Tomé and Príncipe, who is also the Chairman of the Conference of Portuguese-speaking African Countries, and to President Omar Bongo of Gabon, as well as to President Mobutu of Zaire. Meanwhile, on 4 January 1994, I met in New York with the Minister of External Relations of Angola, who delivered to me a letter from President dos Santos, and with whom I held an in-depth discussion on various aspects relating to the implementation of the peace agreement.

12. Consultations between my Special Representative and the leaders of neighbouring countries focused on the latest developments in the Lusaka talks and on the need for urgent action in order to ensure that the pause being observed would not devolve into a suspension sine die of the negotiations. Mr. Beye also requested firm and immediate intervention vis-à-vis the Government and UNITA, so that a truce could be observed pending the announcement of the cease-fire. My Special Representative received the support of all the heads of State concerned.

13. As scheduled, the peace talks resumed in Lusaka on 5 January 1994. During this second round, the composition of the government delegation remained the same. However, the UNITA delegation has changed significantly and is now led by its Secretary-General, Mr. Eugénio Manuvakola, while Mr. Jorge Valentim, the UNITA Secretary for Information, is the deputy head of the team. UNITA explained that the change was due to the fact that the military issues on the agenda had been thoroughly discussed and agreed upon, and that it had therefore been considered necessary to replace the military representatives with civilians.

14. The first plenary meeting was held on 6 January 1994 and was followed by several rounds of intensive proximity talks, combined with informal consultations on the agenda item dealing with the police. After lengthy discussions, these meetings resulted in the adoption of the general and specific principles concerning the police, including the adoption of several important points relating to the modalities governing the Angolan national police.

II. MILITARY SITUATION

15. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/26872), the general military situation has been marked by an intensification of hostilities. Information from the Government and UNITA confirms that skirmishes and ambushes have taken place in several locations in the country. The Government and UNITA have also intensified military preparations, aimed at a possible continuation of the war, should the Lusaka negotiations fail.

16. According to reports received from various sources and confirmed by UNAVEM II military observers, government and UNITA forces have continued to carry out operations in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Benguela, Kwanza Sul, Huíla, Malange, Namibe, Uíge and Kuito/Bié. UNITA has intensified ambushes and laid mines in several locations in the country. Movements and build up of UNITA troops and war matériel have been reported around the cities of Malange, Luena and Moxico. On 5 January 1994, the shelling of Malange prevented the aircraft transporting a delegation of United States congressmen from landing. The Government and UNITA accused each other of bearing responsibility for the incident. Reports of sporadic bombardments of Kuito/Bié were also received by UNAVEM II military observers.

17. In addition, the Government and UNITA have accused each other of launching attacks in several locations around the country. The Government asserted that, on 1 January 1994, UNITA attacked the Chevron petroleum installations in Cabinda; UNITA denied the accusation, saying that the attack was carried out by the Frente de Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC). UNITA, for its part, accused government forces of having carried out air raids over Uíge and Negage on 7 January 1994. Furthermore, in a letter dated 13 January 1994, the head of the UNITA delegation informed my Special Representative that a ship transporting Russian-made heavy armaments en route to Angola had been detained in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. UNITA's radio, "Vorgan", announced that the government army had continued to reinforce its troops in preparation for a large-scale military offensive in several regions of the country.

18. According to information provided by UNAVEM II military observers, the Government has reduced the defence perimeter of cities controlled by UNITA.

19. The military and police personnel of UNAVEM II currently comprises 47 military observers, 23 police observers and 11 military paramedics deployed in 5 locations: Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe. They continued to perform a number of important functions, including patrolling, maintaining extensive contacts with the local authorities, rendering support to humanitarian operations and conducting investigations.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

20. Since my last report to the Security Council, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have made considerable progress in their humanitarian assistance activities throughout Angola. However, in spite of an increase in aid deliveries, there is still an urgent need to strengthen the capacity of both United Nations agencies and NGOs to address the enormous needs of the Angolan population. The recent deterioration in the overall security situation in Malange emphasizes the need to accelerate action by the international community in response to the overwhelming needs of the Angolan people.

21. My Special Representative has continued to follow closely the major issues relating to humanitarian assistance. In Malange, on 22 and 25 December 1993, several security incidents occurred at the food distribution centre of the NGO

"Concern" during one of which a security officer was killed. On 27 December, a vehicle belonging to World Vision International was attacked by uniformed armed men travelling in a military vehicle. During the attack, one of the NGO's local workers was killed and two were injured. In an immediate response to these incidents, Mr. Beye visited Malange to make a formal inquiry. Since then, apart from a shelling incident that prevented a plane carrying visiting United States congressmen from landing there on 5 January, the city has been calm, and WFP now undertakes 8 to 10 flights per day to Malange from both Luanda and Catumbela airports in order to meet the required delivery level of 3,000 tons of food aid per month.

22. Revised estimates show that the total number of people affected in Angola stands at nearly 3.3 million, an increase of 300,000 since my last report. This estimate is based on four types of beneficiaries: displaced persons, conflict-affected and drought-affected persons and returnees who are in need of aid in the sectors of food, health, nutrition, water, sanitation and shelter. Of these, 2.1 million are in need of food aid.

23. With regard to access to areas of extreme need, significant progress was made in negotiations with both the Government and UNITA by the Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs during his visit to Angola from 2 to 10 December 1993. The purpose of his mission was to review United Nations emergency relief activities with particular focus on:

(a) Improving the monitoring of all humanitarian supplies;

(b) Reducing transportation costs;

(c) Expanding emergency assistance throughout Angola;

(d) Reviewing requirements under the overall emergency programme in cooperation and consultation with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit.

As a result of these negotiations, the Government of Angola and UNITA agreed in principle to increased use of two land corridors: Luanda to Malange and Lobito to Kuito/Bié, as well as to the opening of Catumbela airport in Benguela province for humanitarian air operations.

24. In mid-December, WFP was able to fly from Catumbela to Cubal, where the situation was critical. It was the first time that WFP was able to deliver relief supplies to this town since road convoys to that area had been disrupted in August 1993. As of 13 January 1994, WFP had been able to reach seven destinations from Catumbela airport - Malange, Kuito/Bié, Huambo, Luena, Saurimo, Menongue and Cubal - which will ease the congestion at Luanda and allow for increased deliveries. WFP now airlifts food and non-food items to 23 locations and accesses several other destinations by road, compared to only 13 two months ago.

25. As a further positive result of the efforts made by my Special Representative and the recent mission undertaken by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, UNITA officials in Huambo agreed to the increase in humanitarian assistance in UNITA-controlled

areas and signed an agreement allowing international NGOs to work in Huambo. The Executive Director of WFP, Ms. Catherine Bertini, visited Luanda on 21 and 22 January 1994 for discussions on the food aid programme, logistics and related topics. During her visit, Ms. Bertini also met with the Minister of External Relations and was received by President dos Santos, and a letter of understanding between WFP and the Angolan Government was signed.

26. United Nations agencies working in Angola have started to review the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal that was launched in June 1993 in order to update humanitarian aid requirements for the next six months and to introduce some rehabilitation elements in existing emergency relief projects in anticipation of an eventual peace agreement. It should be noted that priority areas for immediate funding are agriculture, health, nutrition, education and water and sanitation, which until now have received very little support.

27. The situation in the intensive conflict areas of Kuito/Bié and Huambo continues to require constant monitoring and more support in view of the overwhelming needs resulting from the collapse of social services. NGOs are being encouraged to go into these areas to cover the overall needs, but recruitment of staff experienced in dealing with such complex and often dangerous tasks has proved to be difficult. United Nations agencies, NGOs and donors have endorsed the proposal that the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit establish a field presence in these cities, as well as in Uíge and Malange, to allow for overall coordination and negotiation on behalf of all humanitarian organizations working in those areas. Meanwhile, in Menongue, the capital of Kuando-Kubango province, the situation appears to have stabilized. However, seeds and tools are now urgently needed for the planting season, which begins at the end of January.

28. The revision of the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for Angola will also address two issues of cardinal importance in the framework of an eventual peace agreement: troop demobilization and the clearance of land mines. Timely action on these issues will not only prevent the further deterioration of living conditions in Angola, but will also link humanitarian assistance efforts to the peace process.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

29. Following the fact-finding mission on the bombardment of locations near the city of Kuito/Bié and the suspension of the Lusaka talks on 24 December 1993, the discussions were reconvened in the Zambian capital on 5 January 1994 to consider the agenda item dealing with the police. The adoption by the Government and UNITA of the general and specific principles relating to the police reconfirms their readiness and political will to pursue the talks in order to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement. This positive attitude is an encouraging development that should be sustained in order to maintain the momentum for a successful conclusion of the talks. I therefore urge the Government and UNITA to redouble their efforts to move the peace process forward.

30. In the coming weeks, an even greater effort will be needed by the Government and UNITA to address outstanding issues, including, in particular, the political questions on the agenda, namely, national reconciliation, the completion of the electoral process, the re-establishment of State administration throughout Angola, the question of the new United Nations mandate in the country and the future role of the three observer States. Above all, national reconciliation remains the primary objective of the peace process. As UNITA has indicated its readiness to dismantle its military structure totally and become a purely political party, it would be essential to reach an understanding on how to reintegrate UNITA personnel into various levels and branches of the Government and State administration. It is imperative that both the Government and UNITA continue to display flexibility in the ongoing negotiations and demonstrate by their actions their political will to achieve a long-lasting peace in Angola.

31. Taking into account the progress made in the Lusaka talks, I would like to reiterate the recommendations contained in my previous report, namely that, for the time being, the Security Council continue to adhere to the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 890 (1993), which would be the most appropriate way to handle the current situation. However, should circumstances so warrant, I will immediately submit to the Council my recommendations about the imposition of additional measures or for the review of those already in effect.

32. Regrettably, notwithstanding the progress made in the Lusaka talks, the military situation in Angola continues to deteriorate. I urge the Government and UNITA to respect the commitments already entered into during the negotiations, to exercise maximum restraint and to put an immediate end to all military operations.

33. In spite of the intensification of military operations, humanitarian activities by the United Nations agencies and NGOs have continued throughout Angola. This crucial humanitarian effort, while helping to alleviate the suffering of the affected population in many parts of the country, also helps to create a climate favourable to a political settlement. I should like to seize this opportunity to renew my appeal to the Government and UNITA to provide the necessary security for the efficient distribution of humanitarian aid to the people of Angola.

34. The peace talks have thus far not reached the point where an effective cease-fire can be established as a basis for the expansion of the current operation of the United Nations in Angola. However, I am continuing with the necessary preparations and contingency planning so that the Organization can be in a position to make an appropriate contribution as soon as a comprehensive settlement is achieved. In furtherance of this objective, a team of two United Nations experts has recently visited Lusaka and Luanda to make a preliminary assessment of the needs in connection with the current contingency planning exercise.

35. The personnel of UNAVEM II has continued to serve with exemplary dedication in difficult circumstances. I should like to pay tribute in particular to my Special Representative and to the Force Commander, for the determination with which they continue to carry out their responsibilities.

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Security Council

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S/1994/101
30 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose a letter by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granic, dated 29 January 1994.

I would appreciate if you could provide for the circulation of the enclosed letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Dr. Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 29 January 1994 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

It is with a great deal of concern and regret that I received information regarding the letter addressed by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, to the Security Council accusing Croatia of "military intervention" against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Republic of Croatia has recently offered the Bosniak-Moslem side a very comprehensive and detailed peace plan, in a sincere effort to achieve a firm, viable and lasting solution to the crisis. As you have probably been informed, this peace proposal begins with a cease-fire and goes as far as proposing readiness for a de facto confederation between the two sides. An agreement opening the way to such a proposal had been reached and signed by the two sides in Geneva on 14 September 1993, as an annex to the public Joint Declaration.

This latest peace proposal was put on the table during the Croat-Moslem negotiations in Bonn-Petersberg and further elaborated and reconsidered in the course of the recent ICFY talks in Geneva. The Bosniak-Moslem side has in the meantime come up with a counter-proposal which is being carefully studied by my Government.

Therefore, my Government must express its surprise over the fact that the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has chosen this particular moment to raise such unfounded accusations.

It seems highly illogical and inappropriate that the Republic of Croatia, while actually proposing and promoting a peaceful settlement, should during the most crucial stage of the negotiations to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina undertake a military offensive, let alone resort to an open military intervention from the outside as suggested by Mr. Silajdzic's letter.

Further, such a move would be highly inconsistent with and would go counter to the policies of my Government. I would like to take this opportunity to remind the Council of the three parallel initiatives which Croatian Government currently promotes: a) normalization of relations with the Bosniak-Moslems as elaborated in the document proposed by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, in Bonn-Petersberg; b) gradual steps designed to lead to normalization, confidence-building and mutual recognition with the FRY and peaceful reintegration of the UNPAs in accordance with all the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, CSCE (S/1994/59) documents, as well as the ICFY documents, including the Badinter Commission rulings; c) negotiations with the Republic of Slovenia on very close and consistent cooperation in the negotiations concerning the matters of succession of the former SFR of Yugoslavia.

My Government addressed the Security Council on several occasions emphasizing that the Bosnian Croat side is the weakest and the least numerous

party in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and exposed to the ongoing military attacks and offensive by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (S/26146; S/26715; S/26835; S/26919). Different and independent sources could as well easily confirm that there is no offensive against the Moslem areas being launched by the forces of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO). On the contrary, Croatian areas particularly in Central Bosnia and around Zepce have been under constant and ruthless attacks by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not even respected the tripartite Christmas cease-fire.

Among other things, this makes the Croats the greatest victim of the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment and raises the question of the Government and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina being actually involved in a war against its own citizens of a different nationality or ethnic roots.

UNPROFOR reports did not confirm accusations by the Bosnian Government concerning "military intervention" by the Croatian Army. On the contrary, UNPROFOR reported that there is no evidence of a major Croatian Army inflow at this moment. In the light of these objective facts, Prime Minister Silajdzic's accusations have to be considered unfounded. To a certain degree they resemble a statement made several weeks ago by another official of the Bosnian Government amounting to a charge that, as part of the UNPROFOR contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the British troops had been a party to the genocide against the Bosnian people.

As to the number of troops being mentioned in the letter (30,000 regular army troops), one must conclude that, were such allegations true, the military situation in Central Bosnia and Posavina would be totally different. The Republic of Croatia could not afford the luxury nor does it have the resources, even if willing to do so, to deploy that many troops in another country while at the same time being faced with the foreign aggression and occupation of the parts of its own territory.

On top of that, most of the units alleged to belong to the Croatian Army do not exist at all. There is no 113th Brigade of Split nor 114th of Sibenik. The same applies to 5th of Zagreb, 109th of Vukovar or, for that matter, to the so-called specialized units like Panthers, Tigers, Black Legions, Jokers, Knights or Lightning, etc.

However, there is a very limited number of the Croatian Army troops in the vicinity of Dubrovnik positioned against the Serb forces and with the only goal of protecting internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia. These troops have been deployed in strict accordance with the agreements signed by the governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12 July 1992. Some of these troops, however, do belong to certain units mentioned in the Prime Minister Silajdzic's letter.

There are, however, approximately 1,500 to 2,000 Croatian volunteers fighting in the HVO units. These persons - fighting for the survival of their compatriots and their native land - are mostly of Bosnia-Herzegovinian origin and almost all of them would under different circumstances easily qualify as citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This certainly would in no way

apply to thousands of extreme fundamentalists recruited in different Islamic countries to fight in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. My Government considers that the Security Council should look further into this matter and make proper judgement not only as to the number of these armed extremists, but also to the sources of extremely significant arms supplies that have apparently come into their possession.

The Government of Croatia expects and is willing to wait for such an unbiased and objective report that can be used as a basis for evaluation of the validity of Mr. Silajdzic's accusations.

The scope, harshness and particularly the timing of Mr. Silajdzic's grossly unfounded accusations against my Government lead me to believe that the Bosniak-Moslem side is not for the time being willing or ready to accept peace negotiations in good faith, but is merely trying to distract the international public opinion and turn the attention of the relevant international fora away from the substance of issues before us.

Nevertheless, I would like, Your Excellency, to use your good offices to renew my invitation to Mr. Silajdzic to return to the negotiating table even before the new round of Geneva talks scheduled for 10 February and engage in further efforts aimed at finding a viable political solution based on the already agreed to principles and arrangements of the Union of three equal constituent peoples.

In the end, I would like to state that the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, has on two occasions requested that complete international control be established over all the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He has also repeatedly called for a complete demilitarisation on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This remains and will remain the policy of my Government.

(Signed) Dr. Mate GRANIC
Deputy Prime Minister
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/102
31 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 28 January 1994 from H.E. Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the joint declaration signed on 19 January 1994 by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

I have the honour to inform you and the members of the Security Council that, as the first step towards normalization of their relations, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia signed the joint declaration in Geneva on 19 January 1994.

As it is evident from the text of the declaration, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia will be guided in the process of normalization of their mutual relations by the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expects that these principles will be respected and equitably treated in full. In this context, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia understands that the signing of the said declaration will not bring into question the respect for the right of peoples to self-determination as one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

The joint declaration is an expression of the desire and preparedness of the two countries to solve all outstanding issues in the former Yugoslavia by peaceful means and through negotiations. The same spirit prevails in the Joint Declaration of the representatives of the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. This declaration is not directed against the third party involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina which can, if it so wishes, improve its relations with the Serb and Croat sides in a similar manner.

The declaration of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia can only have a positive effect on putting an end to the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina since it firmly determines the position of the two sides, absolutely committed to peace.

The act of the signing of the declaration does not formally establish diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia, neither is it an act of mutual formal recognition. However, the two countries demonstrate that this is the goal to which they aspire and which will be attainable when the remaining issues in Serbo-Croatian relations have been resolved. By the same token, this means that the said declaration does not prejudice the question of the final status of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that this question should be resolved through negotiations between the Governments of Croatia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, as the legitimate representative of the Serb people in the United Nations Protected Areas, in accordance with the provisions of the Vance plan.

While signing the joint declaration, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was guided by the assessment that the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues and stable relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia are of enormous importance for peace and security in the entire region. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is prepared to take other measures as well, in the spirit of strengthening mutual trust and in compliance with the relevant document and principles of the United Nations and other international organizations.

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S/1994/103
31 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to submit the attached response of my Government, dated 31 January 1994, to the letter of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Ali Mohamed Osman Yassin, addressed to you (S/1994/71), dated 24 January 1994.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency could have this response circulated as a document Security Council.

(Signed) Ghirmai GHEBREMARIAM
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Response of the Government of Eritrea, dated 31 January 1994, to the letter of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, dated 24 January 1994

A Sudanese popular proverb runs, "Al-ouzur azret mn'el zenb" to mean "the pretext is far worse than the original wrong done ...".

The reply that the National Islamic Front Government in the Sudan in its letter to the Security Council of 24 January 1994 (S/1994/71) has concocted to refute the complaint lodged by the Permanent Representative of Eritrea and the President of Eritrea reflects this proverb. A self-defence that is based on the blatant distortion of facts is fragile like a house of cards. It is especially unfitting when it comes from those who pose as the "Chosen messengers of God or Allah" to spread his word. But we are not surprised. We know full well the nature of the National Islamic Front and its Government.

The National Islamic Front's letter talks a lot about its commitment to fundament principles of international law (paras. 1 and 2). It also claims (para. 6) that the so-called "National Islamic Front" has long been dissolved. Again, this is like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. And though the National Islamic Front may believe otherwise, this gimmick, is too transparent for the neighbours of the Sudan, the countries of the Horn and for those in the international community who have been following events closely.

The accusations that the Eritrean Government has filed against the National Islamic Front Government are not rooted in innuendoes and rumours. Neither was its public action provoked by a single, isolated incident. The case is based on incontrovertible evidence accumulated over a long period of time. Details on specific acts were furnished to the National Islamic Front Government on several occasions in the past in the hope of seeking a remedy to the situation through bilateral dialogue and they can be made available to interested parties.

The National Islamic Front Permanent Representative talks about aid that his Government has extended to Eritrea. The letter states, "The Sudan has ... provided Eritrea with every material and political assistance ... we have helped to build the Eritrean State ..., we have helped ... agricultural development ... by providing 100 tractors" etc. The apparent objective is to portray the National Islamic Front Government as a benefactor of Eritrea and thereby to exonerate it from its misdeeds.

The truth of the matter is that the Eritrean Government too has in the past provided the National Islamic Front Government with considerable assistance both as a gesture of its goodwill and in accordance with its policy of promoting strong bilateral cooperation in the region. Naturally, it has received reciprocal assistance from the National Islamic Front Government. Full details of these transactions can be made available. The Eritrean Ministry of Agriculture did secure from its Sudanese counterpart 100 tractors on the basis of a long-term commercial loan just as, one might add, Khartoum owes the

Government of Eritrea a balance of 6 million United States dollars. But these are standard interactions which have no relevance to the issue at hand. Indeed, if we have gone out of our way to cite these details, it is only because we want to indicate that bilateral cooperation has not been a one-way traffic as the National Islamic Front letter seems to allude.

That successive Governments in the Sudan had often attempted to use the Eritrean struggle and the refugees they hosted as a bargaining chip with their neighbours and to serve their strategy in the region is a well-documented fact. In contrast, the generous and compassionate Sudanese people have throughout shown exemplary hospitality to their distressed Eritrean brothers. The Eritrean people know these facts full well and they are deeply grateful. Few would, however, be impressed if the National Islamic Front claims the credit for it now.

What one finds unpalatable is when the National Islamic Front Government, which is the primary cause for the large number of Sudanese refugees from the south as well as the north and that is ruthlessly exploiting the predicament of the Eritrean refugees to keep them as hostages and forcibly conscript them in its internal wars, poses as an advocate of refugee rights. In this regard, its attempts to question and cast doubts on the well-known policy and commitment of the Eritrean Government to the repatriation programme only betrays its hypocrisy.

We are, of course, prepared to listen if the National Islamic Front can produce or provide tangible information on the "opposition groups operating from within Eritrea itself ... long Red Sea coastline across which [they] may seek clandestine entry", as referred to in its letter. But we have full information about all those who were and are being trained and armed in the Sudan and who cross the border to destabilize our country. We have all the facts in this regard.

In conclusion, the Government of Eritrea wishes to remind the Security Council to take urgent and appropriate action so as the National Islamic Front Government in the Sudan desists from its acts of destabilization against the society and Government of Eritrea in contravention of international law, and stops its deplorable practices of forcible conscription of Eritrean refugees to fight its internal wars in violation of their basic human rights. We urge the Security Council to take necessary action without further delay. Time should not, indeed, be wasted in fruitless exchange of letters while the situation on the ground deteriorates.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/104
31 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council take note with appreciation of your letter dated 17 January 1994 and the annex attached to it (S/1994/53), concerning the Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).

The members of the Council welcome the agreement reached by the parties and express the hope that an early and fair settlement of the conflict in Guatemala can be attained.

The members of the Council will welcome any further communications on developments regarding the matter.

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA
President of the Security Council

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/105
1 February 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made public on 31 January 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement of spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 31 January 1994

The process of peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has recently run up against a grave challenge.

The United States of America has created a momentous crisis that is likely to develop into a catastrophe, at this crucial juncture when prospects are in sight for saving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks from the current deadlock and striking a package solution to the nuclear issue.

As is already known, towards the end of last year, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States agreed on the immediate future measures aimed at holding a third round of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks and reaching a package solution to the nuclear issue, under which the United States will cancel its "Team Spirit" joint military exercises for 1994 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will accept inspection of limited scope of its nuclear facilities required to ensure the continuity of the safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Accordingly, it is within the framework of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States agreement and with our extraordinary patience and maximum tolerance that we have so far discussed with the IAEA secretariat the scope of the inspection intended to provide continuity of the safeguards.

The IAEA secretariat, however, has deliberately ignored the unique status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which set a moratorium on its declared withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and tried stupidly to force full-scope inspections equivalent to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's de facto return to the Treaty, inspections on which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States could reach an accord at their future talks, instead of the inspection designed for continuity of the safeguards.

The demand for full-scope inspection clearly goes against the spirit of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States agreement and it is absolutely beyond discussion at all at this point in time when the United States nuclear threat has yet to be removed and IAEA's partiality and injustice remain to be redressed - factors that have triggered off the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty.

This notwithstanding, the United States, a party to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks, has never tried to help to straighten out the IAEA secretariat's misconduct, but completely reversed the bilateral agreement on the inspection designed exclusively for continuity of the safeguards and officially urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept the demand of the IAEA secretariat for the full-scope inspections.

The United States has gone to the length of imposing a deadline for this and issued an ultimatum that it will not agree to hold a third round of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks but seek "sanctions", unless the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accepts IAEA's demand.

What should be seriously noted is that the United States has again broached the "special inspection" of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's two military sites, which have no relevance at all to its nuclear activities, and taken the lead in the ruckus for international pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is a shameless perfidy against the other party to the dialogue.

All the facts clearly prove that the so far stated United States preference for a negotiated resolution of the issue and its busy coming and going are, in the final analysis, simply a stratagem aimed at devising a pretence for strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and at stalling for time needed to this end.

That the United States machinations of strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are self-evident has been proved by the new war manoeuvre the United States has been pursuing behind the screen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks.

In violation of its repeated commitment to the principle of assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons, the United States plans to go defiantly ahead with its large-scale nuclear war exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises.

United States officials say that they plan to continue other joint military exercises if they cannot conduct the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises now, and they even say openly that these exercises should be held in Hawaii, if not in south Korea.

When we proposed the United States cancellation of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises as a major agenda for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks, our objective was to eliminate the United States nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once and for all, not just to change the name of the military exercises.

The arrogant United States posture for "resolving" the nuclear issue with its nuclear war exercises going on against the other party to the dialogue is a mockery against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a negation of the dialogue itself.

What we cannot overlook is the fact that the United States hardline and conservative forces are pressing ahead on a full scale with the deployment of the "Patriot" missiles in south Korea, as part of their attempts to overpower the Democratic People's Republic of Korea militarily.

Nobody in the world will believe that the United States has the intention to resolve the issue, as the United States launches smile diplomacy at the

negotiating table, as if it were interested in the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons while frantically engaged in the deployment of its missiles to be trained on the other dialogue party from behind the scenes.

This notwithstanding, the United States State Department spokesman's sophistry that the deployment of the United States missiles can in no way be considered provocative to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is really the height of impudence.

The United States reckless new war machinations do not stop here.

The United States Administration sent the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to south Korea in the early days of the new year for a huddle on the "greater intelligence activities vis-à-vis north Korea", a strong indication of the full-scale stage of the war preparations.

It is not difficult now to guess that the United States will move to contrive pretexts for a shift to real military actions.

In the light of this, it has become clear to everyone that the IAEA secretariat has intentionally delayed consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, until the films and batteries of the surveillance cameras installed at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities will have run out, and has now begun attempting full-scope inspections in an intriguing manner, and that these moves have been made in pursuit of the calculated stratagem of the United States.

All the facts clearly show that the United States has no intention at all to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula peacefully but still remains unchanged as ever in its ulterior objectives to strangle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by force at any cost.

With regard to the current crisis resulting from the despicable and dangerous actions of perfidy on the part of the United States, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea solemnly declares its position as follows.

First, if the United States defiantly goes ahead and reverses the promise it has made to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will no longer be bound by the promise it has made to the United States.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's promise to the United States includes all the goodwill measures and commitments it has taken so far unilaterally for the continued Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks and for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, such as the suspension of the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the freeze of all the nuclear activities and the declared intention to renounce the graphite-moderated reactor system.

Second, if the United States has no intention to hold any further round of talks, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, too, will have no intention of doing so.

It will be a gross miscalculation if the United States considers the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States talks as an offering to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has consistently called for negotiations with the United States since the first days of the origination of the nuclear issue, in order to resolve the issue peacefully, not to seek any benefit from the United States.

We have so far lived on our own without any relations with the United States, we can live well on our own in the future, too, and we have become constitutionally adapted to such a life.

Third, if the United States decides to take other options, we will also take our own countermeasures.

In no way does the right of choice belong to big countries only.

The United States hardliners and conservatives must be held totally responsible for the catastrophic consequences arising therefrom, and the south Korean authorities, indiscreetly following their lead, can never extricate themselves from this responsibility.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/106
2 February 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft for purposes of reconnaissance, provocation and the dropping of heat flares continued over the period 10 to 20 January 1994.

10 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 32 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Ayn Zalah, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 46 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qurnah, Lasaq, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah and Salman.

11 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 32 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 31 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Qal'at Salih, Samawah, Amarah, Basra, Qurnah, Salman and Busayyah.

At 1200 hours on 11 January 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft penetrated Iraqi airspace to the south of Artawi flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres. It left at 1435 hours in the direction of Saudi airspace.

12 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 16 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Samawah, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

13 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 24 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Sinjar.

(b) Southern region: 60 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Suq al-Shuyukh, Salman and Ushbayjah.

At 1155 hours on 13 January 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft penetrated Iraqi airspace flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres. It overflew Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, the area to the south of Diwaniyah and the area to the south of Najaf. It left at 1420 hours in the direction of Saudi airspace.

14 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 17 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Dukan, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 52 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah, Salman, Artawi and Busayyah.

At 1008 hours on 14 January 1994, a hostile two-aircraft formation dropped two heat flares 10 kilometres south of Alqosh in the Ninawa Governorate.

15 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 10 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 5 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Samawah, Nasiriyah, Busayyah and Artawi.

16 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 15 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 74 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Amarah, Salman and Shatrah.

At 1355 hours on 16 January 1994, a hostile formation dropped a heat flare 8 kilometres south of Alqosh township in the Ninawa Governorate.

At 1400 hours, a second hostile formation dropped a heat flare 10 kilometres south of the Alqosh area in the Ninawa Governorate.

17 January 1994

(a) Northern region: No aerial activity was reported in the northern region on 17 January 1994.

(b) Southern region: No aerial activity was reported in the southern region on 17 January 1994.

18 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 66 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah and Busayyah.

19 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 12 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 74 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Samawah, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

20 January 1994

(a) Northern region: 44 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Sinjar, Dukan and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 58 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Amarah, Jalibah, Artawi, the area to the south of Diwaniyah and Busayyah.

At 1005 hours on 20 January 1994, a hostile formation dropped four heat flares in the area between Mosul and Kuwayr township in the Ninawa Governorate.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/107
2 February 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 17 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of the Security Council, the following details of the second special session of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, held on 14 January 1994.

At its 39th plenary meeting, held on that date, the Governing Council proceeded to elect a new Vice-President to replace Hungary, the outgoing member. The delegation of the Czech Republic was elected to fill the position by consensus.

At the same plenary meeting, the Council took note of the consolidated claims submitted, after the deadline established by the Council, by various Governments and agencies making claims on behalf of persons unable to approach a Government. In accordance with article 12, paragraph 2, of the provisional rules of procedure for the processing of claims, the Council decided to accept the aforementioned consolidated claims.

The Council received the report of the Chairman of the Working Group dealing with the "order of preference in meeting claims". It decided that informal consultations and negotiations would continue and that the Working Group would report to the plenary at the next session. However, the Council endorsed the agreement of the Working Group whereby, as an ad hoc measure and without prejudice to the result of the said consultations and negotiations, the first batch of claims in category "B", to be considered by the Council in May, should be met at that time from assets held in the Compensation Fund.

The Secretary-General attended the special session and addressed the Governing Council. The text of his address is annexed to the present letter.

The Governing Council decided that the twelfth session would be held from 21 to 25 March 1994.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Fernando VALENZUELA MAZZO
President
Governing Council
United Nations Compensation Commission

Annex

[Original: English]

Remarks by the Secretary-General to the special meeting of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission on 14 January 1994 in Geneva

Thank you, Mr. President, for your warm words of welcome, and for your encouraging report on the work of the United Nations Compensation Commission. I am pleased to be able to join the members of the Commission at this special meeting of its Governing Council.

The work of the United Nations Compensation Commission is important. From the beginning, you have understood that the aim of the Commission is to render justice, and that its purpose is to strengthen the rule of law. I am confident that you will achieve this result. I will do my best to help you to succeed.

The decision to establish this Commission demonstrates the continuing vitality of international law, and shows the enduring relevance of the claims of justice. It reflects the expanding role of the United Nations in all aspects of international relations, and shows the innovative way in which the Organization has faced up to its new responsibilities and challenges.

This is indeed an unprecedented undertaking. For the first time in history, the international community will itself take responsibility for ensuring to war victims the processing, adjudication and payment of compensation claims. The Commission will be required to deal with a huge number of claims: until now, 2,335,000 compensation claims have been submitted by 78 Governments on behalf of their citizens, their corporations and themselves, while the deadlines for filing corporate and government claims has not yet expired.

The immense majority of the claims - over 2 million - were submitted by individuals, with the largest groups of claimants coming from Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Yemen.

The Commission, like its mission, is unique. It is neither a traditional arbitration tribunal, nor a court of law. Its composition, and its procedures, are special. They reflect the peculiar nature of the Gulf War conflict, and the special plight of the victims of that conflict.

As a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, the Commission is assured that its adjudications will be strongly supported. I am also pleased to add, however, that, by selecting commissioners of the highest international standing, this Governing Council has enhanced the reputation of the world Organization and offered to world public opinion - and to all parties concerned - the guarantee of an independent process.

It is expected that, by April 1994, you will be in a position to act on the first awards for compensation. Together, we must work to ensure that sufficient

funds are secured to allow the Commission to honour these awards. We must also work hard to ensure that the Commission is able to meet its other commitments during the present year. Fulfilment of this pledge would be a profound statement of our seriousness and determination. By bringing justice, it would also help to bring needed relief to many suffering victims.

In closing, I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation for your tireless efforts in this very complex and difficult endeavour. I would especially like to commend the Governments of Belgium and Spain for the excellent manner in which they have performed the critical functions of the presidency.

My presence here today reflects my deep appreciation for the important work in which the Commission is engaged. I hope that it will also serve to underline to all concerned the international community's condemnation of aggression, and its rejection of violence as a means of resolving disputes.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/108
2 February 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you about and at the same time I request you to bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council further instances of aggression by the Republic of Armenia against the Azerbaijani Republic.

On the night of 21 to 22 January 1994, a motor-rifle battalion of the 555th independent Motor-Rifle Regiment of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, approaching from the direction of Vardenis in the Republic of Armenia, invaded the territory of the Kelbajar district of the Azerbaijani Republic, violating the State frontier of a sovereign State.

The mission given to the battalion by the Armenian command was to strengthen the "Kelbajar" group of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, which are occupying a considerable part of the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan.

The battalion, whose strength is approximately 240 men and which was armed with automatic weapons, machine-guns and grenade launchers, was transported deep into Azerbaijani territory by 6 lorries, 5 of which were marked "Ural-4320" (number plates: 43-08 ZHK, 43-22 ZHK, 43-23 ZHK, 43-15 ZHK, 43-28 ZHK) and one marked "Kamaz-4310" (number plate: 43-08 ZHK).

The forward movement of the Armenian battalion was halted by sub-units of the Azerbaijani army near the village of Chanly in the Kelbajar district of the Azerbaijani Republic. Several members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia were captured.

The captured Armenian soldiers included, among others, Captain Ashot Agasievich Grigoryan, Commander of the 4th Detachment of the Military Commissariat in the town of Gyumri (formerly Leninakan) in the Republic of Armenia, service record No. 081888; and Senior Lieutenant Samvel Derenikovich Badoyan, Senior Deputy Commander of the 2nd Detachment of the Military Commissariat in the town of Gyumri (formerly Leninakan) in the Republic of Armenia, identity card No. 045871.

On 27 January 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic, together with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of National Security, organized meetings with the Armenian prisoners of war for United Nations representatives, the accredited diplomatic corps in Baky, and local and foreign journalists.

During these meetings, United Nations representatives, foreign diplomats and journalists received information and facts confirming the aggression carried out by the Republic of Armenia against Azerbaijan. The Armenian prisoners of war stated clearly that the war in the territory of Azerbaijan is being waged by Armenia, whose actions can in no way be justified. They also told of several attempts to hold anti-war protest meetings in various Armenian cities, including one held on 14 January 1994 in Yerevan, which were dispersed by the authorities.

At a meeting with journalists, the Armenian prisoners of war called upon the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the entire Armenian people to halt the senseless and unjust war being waged by their country against Azerbaijan, which is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The foregoing constitutes further incontrovertible evidence that the Republic of Armenia, contrary to all elementary norms of international law, is committing aggression against the Azerbaijani Republic, a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, in order to carry out its annexationist plans. In so doing, the Armenian side is systematically implementing a policy aimed at misleading and misinforming the international community, the United Nations and the Security Council, thereby attempting to evade responsibility in every way possible.

The time has come for the Security Council to condemn the Republic of Armenia for carrying out aggression against Azerbaijan and to take appropriate measures under Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the Republic of Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex: copies of the personal documents of the captured members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ВО № 081888

Григорян
Ашот Ягасиевич

Личный № М-630122

ВО № 081888

1. Число, месяц, год и место рождения
2 марта 1950 г.
г. Ленинакан
Армянской ССР

2. Национальность армянин

3. Последний билет выдан Сумгаитским горвоенкоматом Азербайджанской ССР

Военный комиссар Дзержинского района г. Ленинакана
подполковник
"28" ноября 1980 г.

17. Особые отметки

Снят с учета 1 08 93
Военный комиссариат г. Ленинакана

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
УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ ЛИЧНОСТИ
БО № 045871
состоит на действительной военной службе в Вооруженных Силах
БО № 045871
Назначен на должность
Старшего Адъютанта
II-кд 2 мотострелковой
приказом
№ 4057 от 22 сентября 93 г.
Военный Комиссар г. Гянджи
БО № 045871
Назначен
приказом
№ от 19 г.
М. П.
Назначен
приказом
№ от 19 г.
М. П.